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Climate justice in the endgame for 2 degrees 
 
One of the most striking features of Henry Shue’s work on climate justice is its moral anger. 
Shue calls out inadequate governmental action on climate change since 1992 as shameful 
and pathetic. He describes most countries’ Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) 
under the Paris Agreement as ‘paltry’, ‘pitiful’ and ‘farcical’. Those in the Trump 
administration are called ‘environmental vandals’. For many people, the righteous anger 
that simmers beneath the surface of his words is the morally and emotionally appropriate 
response to the delays in political action on climate change that have left us with just 
eighteen years until the carbon budget for two degrees is depleted.1 Shue’s moral anger is 
crystallised in his denunciation of climate policies that depend on some people sacrificing 
subsistence in order that others can enjoy luxuries. The earliest versions of this critical line 
focus on emissions created by subsistence in a global economy locked in to fossil fuels. Later 
versions - including this Breakthrough Article - expand the call for protection of the means 
to subsistence as a non-negotiable feature of any just transition to a zero carbon global 
economy. As Shue puts it, ‘the politically crucial question of the fair sharing of burdens 
cannot be evaded and will not be forgotten’ (p. xxx).   
 
                                                     
1 ‘Carbon Countdown Clock’, The Guardian. Available at https://goo.gl/AWzoGX. Accessed 6 
March 2018. 
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Here, I offer two unconnected reflections. The first relates to the general importance of 
calling out injustice in climate policymaking, of which Shue’s work is a paragon. The second 
suggests ways in which to extend the work that can be done by the moral imperative that 
undergirds Shue’s original commitment to subsistence emissions, and now his support for 
the Climate Equity Reference Framework (CERF) in the transition to a zero carbon global 
economy.  
 
Calling out unjust climate policy  
 
Shue’s calling out of egregious injustices in political action on climate change has been 
resisted. Some people have denied that the climate wrongdoers Shue identifies (most 
frequently, the United States) are in fact at fault (Posner and Weisbach, 2010). Others have 
claimed that taking feasibility seriously puts most of the injustices identified by Shue beyond 
the scope of climate policymaking (Gardiner and Weisbach, 2016); that most ethical 
judgements underdetermine decisions on climate policy (Hulme, 2009; Light and Taraska, 
2016); or that economic valuation must be used to capture everything that matters in 
climate policymaking, including the ethical stakes (Tol, 2008).2  
 
I shall focus on a different path of resistance, which takes seriously the requirement that 
climate policy must serve the ends of climate justice. This is the ‘pragmatist’ view that if 
climate policy is to be an effective instrument of climate justice, the ethical demands of the 
ideals of climate justice must not be at too great a distance from the actual processes and 
                                                     
2 For critique see Spash 2017. 
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parameters of climate policymaking (Light, 2011). For example, ethically infused thinking 
about climate justice could miss the policy mark if the standards it applies to policy 
proposals are too abstract (for example, ‘the dignity of all must be respected’) or too 
rhetorical (for example, ‘let us heal the Earth’). It is obvious that a good way for moral 
arguments and ethical values to make a difference to political action on climate change is to 
engage with the details of climate policies; ideally, as these policies are being decided or 
implemented. But we should not ignore a serious risk in this sort of engagement; viz. that 
immersion in policy analysis can become nothing but policy analysis. Disappearing down this 
rabbit hole risks letting the policy intervention drift loose from its moral anchor. When this 
happens it can be hard to tell whether a pragmatist policy intervention in the name of 
climate justice hits its mark because the intervention has been so leached of freestanding 
ethical commitments that its original purpose is obscured. 
 
In reality, then, any climate ethicist aspiring to engage with policy to make it serve climate 
justice can miss the mark in two ways. Too distant from policy, and the ethics become 
irrelevant; too close to policy, and the ethics disappear. Instead, the ideal should be to bring 
independently justified ethical principles into policy debates in ways that make the 
connection between the principles and the policy recommendation ethically readable both 
to those involved in policy discourse, and to people beyond these narrow circles. A policy is 
ethically readable when the ways in which it promotes, or is consistent with, an ethical 
principle is (or can be made) clear to publics whose interests are protected by the principle. 
For climate policy, the relevant publics encompass the whole of humanity; in particular, 
those portions of humanity most vulnerable to ethically unacceptable climate policy, viz. the 
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world’s poorest people, including those not yet born.3 Ethical readability matters for 
reasons of accountability: people affected by a policy should be able to assess how well that 
policy protects their interests. Arguably, ethical readability also matters for its own sake: 
policy ought to be constrained by at least some ethical principles. The policies we get by 
taking ethical readability seriously will depend on the ethical principles that apply in the 
case.  
 
Here, I want to focus on a different reason why ethical readability matters. This is that 
leaching climate policy of ethical content by too much well-intentioned policy wonkery – 
and thereby failing standards of ethical readability - could do damage to people most 
vulnerable to climate change, for the following reasons. We know that moral convictions 
about climate change can be motivating and likely to stimulate action in the right 
circumstances (Markowitz and Shariff 2012). Circumstances that are not right include those 
in which people with moral convictions about climate change lack efficacy with respect to 
bringing about the outcomes they value. When people repeatedly fail to influence political 
decision making in ways that are informed by what they care about, their inefficacy can 
curdle into apathy or defensiveness (Täuber et al., 2015). If what people care about is justice 
in climate policy, this is bad news insofar as it dilutes pressure from below on politicians to 
craft just climate policy.   
 
                                                     
3 There are hard questions about how to ensure the interests of future people are respected 
in climate policymaking, and politics. For creative answers see (González-Ricoy and 
Gosseries, 2016). 
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We should be worried about this given the following facts. Climate impacts will cause most 
damage to people in the world’s poorest countries. Rich countries have the greatest 
potential to minimise these unjust damages because their historical responsibility for 
climate change has endowed them with a capacity to slash emissions (as required by climate 
justice) that is not matched by equivalent capacities in poorer countries. The historical 
emissions of the richest countries have enabled them to develop in ways that have made 
them resilient to the climate change that now makes carbon-intensive development by the 
poorest countries of the world impossible if we are to achieve the highest ambitions of the 
Paris Agreement. Furthermore, these countries also bear most responsibility as a result of 
their present emissions. Rich, climate resilient countries have more direct control over the 
flow of emissions that are on course to deplete the carbon budget, and can be asked to bear 
enormous cuts to these emissions without significant ethical loss, given that a large 
proportion are luxury emissions.  
 
Taking these facts together, the action on climate change of the world’s richest and most 
climate resilient countries has greater potential to minimise climate injustice than that of 
the world’s poorest and least resilient countries: these countries can prevent (or at least, 
slow down) depletion of the carbon budget in ways demanded by climate justice, and have 
a duty to lead on this.4 If citizens of the richest and most stable countries in the world 
                                                     
4 As Shue points out, these countries in fact have a duty to do far more than this. Given the 
failure of past political action to significantly reduce emissions, cuts must be accompanied 
by technology and resource transfer to enable net zero without violating the basic rights of 
people at risk of losing land and access to water through, for example, BECCS (Shue, 2017). 
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become apathetic and defensive about just climate policy, they are far less likely to exercise 
whatever influence they have – for example, through NGOs - on climate policymakers at 
national and global levels to avoid unjust climate policy.  
 
Here is where the ethical readability of climate policy matters for climate justice. In the face 
of climate policy deliberations leached of explicit ethical commitments, it could easily 
appear to people committed to climate justice that a major route to avoiding climate 
injustice has been shut down. The protestations of well-intentioned policy wonks that the 
train is still on track, despite appearances to the contrary, risk leaving ethically motivated 
people enervated. For such people, the values of justice they cleave to must be recognisable 
in climate policy that (at least) avoids injustice. If the climate policy of the world’s richest 
and most climate resilient countries remains egregiously unjust, despite the best efforts of 
climate justice champions in those countries, a wellspring of ethical criticism of these 
policies could run dry. However dim they are now, if the lights go out on climate justice in 
public discourse about climate change, the prospects for policy designed to minimise 
climate injustice will become even shakier, given how enormously tempting it is for 
politicians to make self-serving decisions and dress them up as pragmatic climate action 
(Gardiner, 2011)(Gardiner, 2013).5 By insisting on climate policies that make their climate 
justice commitments readable to people who care about climate justice, we will increase 
the likelihood of achieving more climate justice by bolstering the efficacy of people disposed 
                                                     
5 Of course, the most obvious reason why climate policy ought to promote climate justice is 
that policymakers – like everyone else – have duties to promote justice.   
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to put the right kind of pressure on political leaders.6 
 
I have argued that we must bring policy discourse closer to whatever ethically informed 
public discourse exists. This means encouraging policy discussions explicitly to address the 
justice and ethics dimensions of the policies in ways that make the justice outcomes of the 
policies readable as such to people who are committed to climate justice. Policy-engaged 
work, such as that by Shue on subsistence emissions, is vital for the generation of these 
discussions. This type of ethically engaged policy discourse would not only avoid enervating 
people already committed to climate justice, it could also spread these commitments. One 
good way to bring outsiders into a normative debate – so that they become motivated by 
the ethical principles around which the praise and blame practices of any society are 
oriented – is for political leaders to unambiguously and clearly govern in ways that promote 
values around which a sense of belonging can coalesce, and from which ethical convictions 
can be strengthened (Täuber et al. 2015, 460-1).7 Rather than seeking pragmatic routes to 
climate policies that risk draining away climate justice altogether, policymakers could be 
crafting climate policies so as to build and strengthen values friendly to climate justice in the 
communities they serve. The steps from this process to legislative and policy change to 
promote a robust vision of climate justice might then be taken more quickly.  
 
Henry Shue’s insistence that basic rights to subsistence – the rights of people we are moving 
                                                     
6 An additional benefit of ethical readability is that is keeps alive hope for climate justice. 
See (McKinnon, 2014). 
7 See (Caney, 2012).  
 9 
with together through time, and the rights of people whose world will be what we make it – 
provides fuel for these processes. His earliest presentations of the division of the remaining 
carbon budget as a zero sum game between those whose lives depend on subsistence 
emissions, and those whose pleasures require continued luxury emissions, has a force that 
does not depend on accepting any high moral theory. Now that remaining within the budget 
looks impossible with emissions reductions alone, making NETs and a massive upscaling of 
renewables necessary for us to avoid catastrophic warming, the basic right to subsistence 
retains its force.   
 
Climate engineering and the constraints of justice 
 
In his Breakthrough Article, Shue shows the clear policy implications of protecting the basic 
right to subsistence in our present endgame for transition to a zero carbon global economy. 
First, he shows how the Climate Equity Reference Framework (CERF) for assessing NDCs 
under the Paris Agreement supports subsistence emissions for development for countries 
below a morally defensible threshold. At the same time, CERF offers a two pronged 
construal of the mitigation duties of rich, high emitting countries: their luxury emissions 
must be reduced and they must finance renewables in countries below the development 
threshold, until zero carbon is achieved.8 And second, he identifies the threats to basic 
rights to subsistence that are created if NDCs fail to conform to CERF, which could make 
increasingly heavy reliance on large scale carbon dioxide removal (CDR) a serious policy 
                                                     
8 I do not mean to suggest here that emissions reductions and scaling up of renewables ala 
CERF is sufficient for zero carbon. 
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option. As Shue argues, the CDR technology assumed by most IPCC scenarios in which 
warming is limited to two degrees or less - bioenergy combined with carbon capture and 
storage (BECCS) – requires land and water usage that will compete with what is needed to 
satisfy the subsistence rights of the world’s poorest people. Given the sorry history of how 
the world’s highest emitting and richest countries have prioritised their luxury emissions 
over the subsistence emissions of the most vulnerable members of the human community, 
we have reason to be seriously worried about this pattern repeating in a climate engineered 
world of BECCS (Shue, 2017). 
 
In fact, I think the threats to basic rights in the endgame for limiting warming to two 
degrees are even greater than shown by Shue. CDR is not the only type of climate 
engineering. In addition, solar radiation management (SRM) is being discussed as a way to 
buy additional time for emissions reductions. Although CDR and SRM are both forms of 
climate engineering insofar as they involve ‘deliberate large-scale manipulation of the 
planetary environment to counteract anthropogenic climate change’ (The Royal Society 
2009, p. 1), they operate differently. Whereas CDR removes carbon dioxide from the 
atmosphere, SRM methods reduce warming without extracting any greenhouse gases. SRM 
methods deflect solar radiation away from the planet by increasing the planet’s albedo 
through altering the reflectivity of the surface, clouds, or the atmosphere. A prominent field 
experiment for SRM technology is due to take place soon and the pace may pick up 
thereafter.9 There are signs that geoengineering is catching the attention of legislators and 
diplomats: the US Senate appropriations committee recently passed a spending bill that 
                                                     
9 See https://geoengineering.environment.harvard.edu/. Accessed 8 November 2018. 
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included funding to support geoengineering research (Nuccitelli, 2016); there have been 
recent US house subcommittee hearings on geoengineering; and the head of the IPCC, 
Hoesung Lee, has said that Panel should be examining SRM - including its governance - very 
seriously (Goldberg, 2016).10 
 
The particular form of SRM around which most activity is happening is stratospheric aerosol 
injection (SAI), which proposes to deliver reflective particles (most commonly, sulphur) to 
the stratosphere. Prominent scientific researchers in SRM make the case for accelerated 
research in this area in terms of SRM as a potentially powerful, relatively cheap, and 
effective tool to achieve a reduction in the rate of temperature increase to buy time for 
mitigation (Keith, 2013; MacMartin et al., 2014). Although SRM research is in its infancy, it is 
not hard to imagine its allure (McMahon, 2017), especially for rich countries that declare 
their luxury emissions as a way of life,11  billionaire philanthropists enthusiastic about 
techno-fixes (Nelsen, 2017), and fossil fuel companies who see the end coming and need to 
feed the bottom line.  
 
Just as with BECCS, the most sober calls for research into SRM declare commitment to 
protecting the world’s most vulnerable people (Horton and Keith, 2016). However, a 
number of studies have suggested that, whether deployed uniformly across the globe, or 
                                                     
10 See (Chhetri et al., 2018). 
11 Just before the start of the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, President George H.W. 
Bush declared: “The American way of life is not up for negotiations. Period.” 
 
 12 
concentrated in a particular hemisphere, SAI could have disastrous effects on the world’s 
poorest people. Models have suggested that SAI could disrupt Asian and African summer 
monsoons (Robock et al., 2008), reduce in precipitation in Africa, South America and South 
East Asia (Svoboda et al., 2011), increase tropical cyclone frequency (Jones et al., 2013), and 
cause drought in the Sahel (Haywood et al., 2013). Noting this, two leading figures in the 
SRM scientific research community reply that, ‘[i]ntroducing multiple spatial and temporal 
degrees of freedom [in insolation reduction] has the potential to improve how well SRM can 
compensate for CO2-induced climate change, and thus reduce concerns over the resulting 
regional inequalities’ (Macmartin et al. 2013: 365). In other words, enabling deployment of 
SRM at different places on the globe, at different times, could allay the worst outcomes for 
the world’s poorest people without diminishing the overall cooling benefits of SAI. This is, 
the authors suggest, a way of making more palatable the range of ‘trade-offs’ SAI 
necessitates. 
 
We should not be reassured by this. Regional and temporal variations in SAI deployment 
would not remove the need for trade-offs; redolent as it is of maximising consequentialism 
in policy making, the language of ‘trade-offs’ should set ethical alarm bells ringing. From Rio 
onwards, rich and powerful countries responsible for climate change have without fail 
prioritised their luxury emissions over the subsistence emissions of poor and vulnerable 
countries with miniscule historical emissions. It is naïve to the point of incredulity to think 
that these same countries could be trusted to trade off their own luxury emissions so as to 
give priority to the basic subsistence rights of the world’s poorest people. Introducing 
regional and temporal variations in SAI deployment has the potential to twist the ‘moral 
hazard’ created by SRM so as to pin the world’s poorest people at the end of the spike of 
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delayed emissions reductions by the rich.12  
 
Perhaps this is not inevitable. Perhaps, with the right governance of the research and 
development of SRM, the ethically horrible dangers of potential deployment could be 
neutralised. This can only happen if we strenuously align policy and governance 
conversations with demanding ideals of climate justice, with Shue’s work on the moral 
primacy of subsistence over luxury at front of this mix. 
 
My comments here have been supportive of Shue’s approach: there is no point in posturing 
otherwise when the stakes are so high. Shue was one of the first political philosophers to 
present the challenges of climate change as ethical problems. His moral clarity of vision and 
analytical power have combined to identify ethically acceptable, and morally heinous, 
climate policies, in ways that speak to people across the spectrums of theory and practice, 
and from many different disciplinary perspectives. Very few political philosophers have 
achieved this. If we aim to get through this century’s climate crisis with any semblance of 
justice in our means and ends, we need Shue’s body of work as our guide. 
 
                                                     
12 The terminology of ‘moral hazard’ originates in debates about insurance. The central 
thought is that when insurance is in place to cover an unwelcome outcome, people are less 
likely to avoid the behaviour that increases the likelihood of the outcome. Applied to 
geoengineering, the central worry is deployment – or even just research into the technology 
– could undermine mitigation through reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. See Hale 
2012. 
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